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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
Mount Holly Township (the “Township”) has 
proposed a redevelopment plan that would eliminate the 
existing homes in its Gardens neighborhood, occupied 
predominantly by low-income residents, and replace them 
with significantly more expensive housing units.  Appellants, 
an association of Gardens residents organized under the name 
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, and 23 current and 
former residents of the neighborhood (collectively the 
“Residents”) filed suit against the Township alleging 
violations of various anti-discrimination laws.   
 
Before the Township filed an Answer or discovery on 
these allegations had taken place, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to the Township.  Because the District 
5 
Court misapplied the standard for deciding whether the 
Residents could establish a prima facie case under Title VIII 
and because it did not draw all reasonable inferences in the 





The homes in this dispute are located in a 30-acre 
neighborhood called the Gardens in the Township of Mount 
Holly in Burlington County, New Jersey.  The Gardens is the 
only neighborhood in the Township comprised predominantly 
of African-American and Hispanic residents.  It is poor—
almost all of its residents earn less than 80% of the area’s 
median income; with most earning much less.   
 
The 3292
                                              
1 Because this is an appeal from a motion granting 
summary judgment, we examine the record evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving parties, here the 
Residents, while resolving all reasonable inferences in their 
favor.  Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 homes in the Gardens are predominantly 
two-story buildings made out of solid brick.  Built in the 
1950s, the homes are attached in rows of 8 to 10 and are set 
back from the curving streets to allow for front and back 
yards, with alleys running behind each housing block.  Two 
major commercial districts abut opposite sides of the 
neighborhood, which is only a mile away from the major 
 
2 The record inconsistently describes the number of 
homes as 327 or 329.  (JA 61, 776, 1114).  
 
6 
downtown business district.  Until 2004, the neighborhood 
was also home to a playground and a community center. 
 
The 2000 census provides a snapshot of the 
neighborhood.3  According to that data, the Gardens 
neighborhood was split evenly between rental properties 
(with a median rental price of $705 per month) and 
homeowners (the median cost of homeownership was $969 
per month).  Eighty-one percent of the homeowners had lived 
in their homes for at least 9 years; 72% of renters had lived 
there for at least five years.  Of the 1,0314
 
 residents living in 
the neighborhood, 203, or 19.7%, were non-Hispanic Whites; 
475, or 46.1% were African-Americans; and 297, or 28.8% 
were Hispanic, the highest concentration of minority residents 
within Mt. Holly.  Almost all of these residents were 
classified as “low income”; indeed, most were classified as 
having “very low” or “extremely low” incomes. 
                                              
3 The parties dispute the utility of data from the 2000 
census.  However, none of the parties has briefed or even 
asked the question of when precisely the violations at issue in 
this case began.  This issue is important because the 
redevelopment process began in 2002 and, as a result, the 
demographics of the township have changed.  Disputes over 
which census numbers to use thus create a moving target; 
however, the 2000 census data appears to provide the most 
accurate demographic data at the inception of the 
redevelopment process.   
 
4 This is an approximate number provided by the 
Residents’ expert.  Elsewhere in the record, the neighborhood 
is described as home to 1,605 people.  (JA 1114). 
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The neighborhood was not perfect.  For one, it was 
crowded.  This created a parking shortage, which led 
residents to pave their backyards for use as driveways, which, 
in turn, led to drainage problems.  In addition, the fact that the 
homes were owned in fee simple meant there was no one with 
a vested interest in maintaining common spaces, such as the 
alleys.  Some of the owners were nothing more than absentee 
landlords, renting to individuals with little interest in 
maintaining the properties.  Over the years, many of the 
properties fell into disrepair.  Vacant properties were boarded 
up, some yards filled with rubbish, and parts of the area 
became blighted.  Because the houses were connected to one 
another, the dilapidation of one house could and sometimes 
did lead to the decay of the adjoining houses.  Finally, the 
dense population, narrow streets, and vacant properties 
facilitated crime.  In 1999, 28% of crimes in the Township 
occurred in the Gardens, even though that neighborhood 
covers only 1.5% of the Township’s land area. 
 
These many problems were not ignored.  Local 
community activists and business leaders worked to revitalize 
the Gardens through a private initiative that eventually came 
to be known as “Mt. Holly 2000.”  This community endeavor 
sought to reverse the neighborhood’s decline by rehabilitating 
properties and increasing social services.  Despite sporadic 
achievements—ten homes were renovated and a community 
policing center was established—the neighborhood’s 
problems continued. 
 
In the year 2000, the Township commissioned a study 
to determine whether the Gardens should be designated as an 
“area in need of redevelopment” under New Jersey’s 
redevelopment laws.  The resulting report, issued on 
8 
November 8, 2000 concluded that the area offered a 
“significant opportunity for redevelopment” because of 
blight, excess land coverage, poor land use, and excess crime.  
(JA 699).  That same year, the Township began to acquire 
properties in the Gardens.  Those properties were left vacant. 
 
A series of redevelopment plans followed.  In 2003, 
the Township issued the Gardens Area Redevelopment Plan 
(“GARP”).  This plan called for the demolition of all of the 
homes in the neighborhood and the permanent or temporary 
relocation of all of its residents.  In their place, the plan 
provided for the construction of 180 new market-rate housing 
units, thirty of which would be available only to senior 
citizens.  The plan was changed in 2005 to include a parcel of 
land immediately north of the Gardens. This plan, the West 
Rancocas Redevelopment Plan, also called for the destruction 
of most of the original Gardens homes, to be replaced with 
228 new residential units composed of two-family dwellings 
and townhouses.  Unlike the GARP, the West Rancocas plan 
provided for the optional rehabilitation of some of the original 
Gardens homes and allowed for the residents of those 
rehabilitated units to be temporarily relocated in phases so 
that they could remain in the neighborhood.  The West 
Rancocas plan also contemplated that 10% of the 228 units 
would be designated as affordable housing.  Finally, in 2008, 
the plan was changed again.  This time, the Revised West 
Rancocas Redevelopment Plan called for construction of up 
to 520 houses, 75% of which could be townhouses and 50% 
of which could be apartments.  The revised plan called for 
only 56 deed-restricted affordable housing units, 11 of which 
would be offered on a priority basis to existing Gardens 
residents.  This revised plan did not include any rehabilitation 
of existing units. 
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At each stage of the process, many Gardens residents 
objected to the redevelopment, complaining about the 
destruction of their neighborhood and expressing fear that 
they would not be able to afford to live anywhere else in the 
Township.  One resident complained that the house next to 
hers was torn down and that a bulldozer had hit her home, 
tearing the wall, cracking the ceiling, and shifting her roof.  
(JA 577-78, 1001).  Another resident, a 70-year-old disabled 
homeowner, told the Township’s Planning Board that, were 
he displaced, he would be unable to work and unable to 
afford a new home.  (JA 1002).  At one meeting in 2005, a 
planning expert testified that the West Rancocas plan was 
deficient because it only allowed rehabilitation as an option, 
without requiring or even encouraging it.  He also said that 
90% of the Gardens’ existing residents would not be able to 
afford the newly-constructed homes and complained that the 
plan did not provide an estimate of affordable housing in the 
existing market for displaced residents.  (JA 990, 1117). 
 
Despite these complaints, work on the development 
continued.  In February 2006 Keating Urban Partners, LLC, 
was chosen as the plan developer.  Keating, in turn, hired 
Triad to develop a relocation plan.  That plan, the Workable 
Relocation Assistance Plan (“WRAP”), was submitted to the 
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs on September 
28, 2006 and provided that all residents living in the Gardens 
on August 1, 2006 would receive relocation assistance.  
Qualified homeowners would receive $15,000 and a $20,000 
no-interest loan to assist in the purchase of a replacement 




  The estimated cost of a new home in 
the development was between $200,000 and $275,000, well 
outside the range of affordability for a significant portion of 
the African-American and Hispanic residents of the 
Township.   
Renters were authorized to receive up to $7,500 of 
relocation assistance, but were not eligible for relocation 
funds to return to the Gardens.  In any case, the vast majority 
of those renters would be unable to afford the proposed 
market-rate rent of $1,230 per month.  Eventually, the 
Township paid to relocate 62 families, 42 of which moved 
outside of Mt. Holly Township.  Renters who moved often 
had to pay more in rent at their new homes. 
 
Although the redevelopment plan called for building in 
phases, the Township began to acquire and demolish all of the 
homes in the Gardens, thereby displacing many residents and 
creating conditions that encouraged the remaining residents to 
leave.  By August 2008, 75 homes had been destroyed and 
148 homes had been acquired and left vacant.  Later that fall, 
the Township demolished 60 more homes.  And, in the 
summer of 2009, 50 more homes were knocked down.  
Residents living amongst the destruction were forced to cope 
with noise, vibration, dust, and debris.  Worse, the 
interconnected nature of the houses triggered a cascading 
array of problems.  Uninsulated interior walls were exposed 
to the outside and covered with unsightly stucco or tar.  But 
these coatings did not extend below grade, allowing moisture 
to seep into subterranean crawl spaces, creating an 
                                              
5 One home sold for $64,000 and another sold for 
$81,000. 
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environment for mold problems.  Above, the demolitions 
opened the roofs of adjoining homes.  Those openings were 
patched with plywood, which was insufficient to stop water 
leaks.  Around the neighborhood, homes bore the scars of 
demolition:  hanging wires and telephone boxes, ragged brick 
corners, open masonry joints, rough surfaces, irregular 
plywood patches, and damaged porches, floors and railings.  
Destruction of the sidewalks outside demolished homes 
further contributed to the disarray by making it difficult to 
navigate through the neighborhood. By June 2011, only 70 
homes remained under private ownership and the Township 
was in the process of demolishing 52 properties that it had 
acquired.  These conditions discouraged any attempt at 
rehabilitating the neighborhood and encouraged existing 
residents to sell their homes for less than they otherwise 
might have been worth.  
 
 In October 2003, Citizens in Action filed a suit in state 
court alleging violations of New Jersey’s redevelopment laws 
and procedures, and various anti-discrimination laws.  
Ultimately, the New Jersey Superior Court dismissed some 
counts and granted summary judgment to the Township on 
the others, concluding that there was no violation of New 
Jersey law, that the area was blighted, and that the anti-
discrimination claims were not ripe because the plan had not 
yet been implemented. The Appellate Division affirmed, and 
the New Jersey Supreme Court denied a petition for 
certiorari. 
 
The Residents filed suit in the District Court on May 
27, 2008, raising the anti-discrimination claims that had not 
been ripe in their state suit.  The federal complaint alleged, 
among other things, violations of the Fair Housing Act (the 
12 
“FHA”), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968; the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19826; and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.7
 
  The Residents asked for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the redevelopment 
plan, as well as damages or compensation that would allow 
Gardens residents to obtain housing in the Township.  The 
Residents’ motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.  
After they filed an Amended Complaint, the Township, along 
with the other named defendants, filed motions to dismiss.  
The District Court converted these into motions for summary 
judgment and, after allowing the parties time to brief the 
motions, granted summary judgment to the Township 
defendants.  The District Court ruled that there was no prima 
facie case of discrimination under the FHA and that, even if 
there was, the Residents had not shown how an alternative 
course of action would have had a lesser impact.  
The Residents filed a timely appeal and we granted the 
Residents’ motion to stay redevelopment pending this appeal.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
II. 
                                              
6 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the 
United States shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.”  
 
7 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in 
pertinent part that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
13 
 
We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s 
ruling on summary judgment.  See Disabled in Action of 
Pennsylvania v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 
92 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Summary judgment is appropriate only 
where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact . . . and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Melrose, Inc. v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 
The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . 
. or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).  A dwelling can be 
made otherwise unavailable by, among other things, action 
that limits the availability of affordable housing.  See, e.g., 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 
926, 928-29, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1988); Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1059, 1062-64 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 
1977).  The FHA can be violated by either intentional 
discrimination or if a practice has a disparate impact on a 
protected class.  Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 
421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
Disparate impact claims, which do not require proof of 
discriminatory intent, see Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147-48, permit 
federal law to reach “[c]onduct that has the necessary and 
foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation[, which] 
can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct 
in frustrating the national commitment to replace the ghettos 
by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”  Metro. 
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Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 
1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977).  In order to determine whether 
action of this sort was “because of race” we look to see if it 
had a “racially discriminatory effect,” i.e., whether it 
disproportionately burdened a particular racial group so as to 
cause a disparate impact.  Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 146-48; see also 
Lapid-Laurel, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of 
South Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2002) (featuring 
claims of a disparate impact on handicapped persons in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)).  This is called a prima facie 
case of discrimination.  Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 & n.31.  If 
such a case is established, then we look to see whether the 
defendant has a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
actions.  Id. at 148.  If it does, the defendant must then also 
establish that “no alternative course of action could be 
adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less 
discriminatory impact.”  Id. at 149.  Finally, if the defendant 
makes this showing, the burden once again shifts to those 
challenging the action, who must demonstrate that there is a 
less discriminatory way to advance the defendant’s legitimate 




When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Residents, the evidence submitted by the Residents was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.  “[N]o single test 
controls in measuring disparate impact,” but the Residents 
must offer proof of disproportionate impact, measured in a 
plausible way.  Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 
466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).  Typically, “a disparate 
impact is demonstrated by statistics,” id. at 1286, and a prima 
facie case may be established where “gross statistical 
15 
disparities can be shown.”  Hazleton Sch. Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).  According to the data in 
the 2000 census conducted before the redevelopment plan 
began, 22.54% of African-American households and 32.31% 
of Hispanic households in Mount Holly will be affected by 
the demolition of the Gardens.  The same is true for only 
2.73% of White households.  In short, the Residents’ 
statistical expert has calculated that African-Americans would 
be 8 times more likely to be affected by the project than 
Whites, and Hispanics would be 11 times more likely to be 
affected.  Furthermore, the 2000 data showed that only 21% 
of African-American and Hispanic households in Burlington 
County would be able to afford new market-rate housing in 
the Gardens, compared to 79% of White households.   
 
The District Court’s first error was in rejecting the 
Residents’ statistical submissions, which should have been 
taken in the light most favorable to them at this stage in the 
proceedings.  These statistics, like those presented in Rizzo 
and other prominent housing discrimination cases, show a 
disparate impact.  In Rizzo, the plaintiffs presented evidence 
that, of the 14,000-15,000 people on a waiting list for public 
housing, 85% were black and 95% were of a minority 
background.  564 F.2d at 142.  Under these circumstances, we 
concluded that the cancellation of a public housing project 
had a “racially disproportionate effect, adverse to Blacks and 
other minorities in Philadelphia.”  Id.  Similarly, the plaintiffs 
in the Second Circuit case of Huntington Branch used 
statistics showing that while only 7% of the residents in a 
town required subsidized affordable housing, 24% of that 
town’s Black residents required such housing, which meant 
that Black residents were three times more likely to be 
affected by a shortage of affordable housing.  844 F.2d at 
16 
929.  And in Keith v. Volpe, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the FHA was violated where a blocked housing project had 
twice the adverse impact on minorities.  858 F.2d 467, 484 
(9th Cir. 1988).  The disparate impact here, while not as 
extreme as the impact in Rizzo, is similar to or greater than 
the disparate impact found sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case elsewhere.  Under these circumstances, the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Township. 
 
Further, the District Court’s challenge to these 
statistics in a footnote did not make the appropriate 
inferences.  (JA 15-16 n.9).  Instead, the District Court 
challenged the statistical analysis underlying the 21% figure 
of Burlington County minority residents who could afford 
units the redeveloped Gardens as both too broad, because it 
took account of the entire population of Burlington County, 
and too narrow because it failed to consider  minorities 
outside the county who might move in.  
 
In addition, the District Court said the 21% figure did 
not take into account the fact that 56 of the units in the 
Revised West Rancocas Plan would be designated as 
affordable housing.  But the District Court’s analysis failed to 
take into account the Residents’ evidence that these units, 
although labeled “affordable,” would be out of reach for 
almost all of the Gardens residents.   
 
The District Court also said that the statistics failed to 
take into account non-minority purchasers who might rent to 
minorities.  But, unless those purchasers offered below-
market rents, this would not affect the inference that the 
project had a disproportionate effect on Blacks and Hispanics 
who would be unable to afford market-rate units.  
17 
 
As to the District Court’s concern that the statistics did 
not take into account minorities who might move elsewhere 
in Mount Holly, the Residents’ expert opined that affordable 
housing in the Township was scarce, and that most Gardens 
residents would not be able to afford market-rate units 
elsewhere in the Township.   
 
Lastly, the District Court erred when it rejected a 
reasonable inference in favor of the Residents by looking at 
the absolute number of African-American and Hispanic 
households in Burlington County that could afford homes.  
Instead, the District Court should have looked to see whether 
the African-American and Hispanic residents were 
disproportionately affected by the redevelopment plan.  See 
Huntington, 844 F.2d at 938 (“By relying on absolute 
numbers rather than on proportional statistics, the district 
court significantly underestimated the disproportionate impact 
of the Town’s policy.”); Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 
1286 (“[I]t may be inappropriate to rely on absolute numbers 
rather than on proportional statistics.”) (quoting Huntington, 
844 F.3d at 928.).8
 
 
 There is another problem.  The District Court’s most 
troubling error is its conflation of the concept of disparate 
treatment with disparate impact.  The District Court 
essentially agreed with the Township that because 100% of 
minorities in the Gardens will be treated the same as 100% of 
non-minorities in the Gardens, the Residents failed to prove 
                                              
8 The Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae 
brief agreeing that the District Court erred in its disparate 
impact prima facie case analysis.  
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there is a greater adverse impact on minorities.  This was in 
error.  We need not simply ask whether the White residents at 
the Gardens are treated the same as the minority residents at 
the Gardens.  The logic behind the FHA is more perceptive 
than that.  It looks beyond such specious concepts of equality 
to determine whether a person is being deprived of his lawful 
rights because of his race.  Rather, a disparate impact inquiry 
requires us to ask whether minorities are disproportionately 
affected by the redevelopment plan.  Thus the Residents can 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing 
that minorities are disproportionately burdened by the 
redevelopment plan or that the redevelopment plan “[falls] 
more harshly” on minorities.  Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 
315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 
 The Township asserts that a disparate impact approach 
would result in the unintended consequence of halting the 
redevelopment of minority neighborhoods and that it is 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of 
Memphis v. Greene, which states that 
 
 [b]ecause urban neighborhoods are so 
frequently characterized by a common ethnic or 
racial heritage, a regulation’s adverse impact on 
a particular neighborhood will often have a 
disparate effect on an identifiable ethnic or 
racial group.  To regard an inevitable 
consequence of that kind as a form of stigma so 
severe as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment 
would trivialize the great purpose of that charter 
of freedom. 
   
451 U.S. 100, 128 (1981). 
19 
 
 There are three problems with the Township’s 
position.  First, City of Memphis was concerned with the 
standard for establishing a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on the “badges and incidents of slavery in 
the United States.”  Id. at 125-26.  Whatever that standard 
might be—a question left open by the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in that case, see id. at 130 (White, J., concurring)—City of 
Memphis did not consider the FHA.  All of the courts of 
appeals that have considered the matter, including this one, 
have concluded that plaintiffs can show the FHA has been 
violated through policies that have a disparate impact on a 
minority group.  See Greater New Orleans Fair Housing 
Action Center v. HUD, 639 F.3d 1078, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(acknowledging the majority view but declining to take a 
position on the matters); Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 
F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile 
Estates P'ship v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 
1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 
(11th Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of 
Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); Keith, 
858 F.2d at 482-84; United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 
F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 
F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065; 
United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 
1978); Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147-48; Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
558 F.2d at 1290; United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 
F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).  
 
Second, the Township’s approach urges us to conclude 
that the FHA is violated only when a policy treats each 
individual minority resident differently from each individual 
White resident.  Under our precedent, a plaintiff may 
20 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by 
demonstrating that the policy disproportionately affects or 
impacts one group more than another—facially disparate 
treatment need not be shown.  For instance, in Rizzo, the 
waiting list for public housing comprised 85% African-
Americans and 95% minorities, meaning that 5% were White.  
564 F.2d at 142.  The White residents on the list were treated 
the same as the minority residents on the list—each was hurt 
by Philadelphia’s decision to block a public housing 
project—but we nevertheless found a violation of the FHA 
because cancelling the project had a “racially disproportionate 
effect” on African-Americans.  Id. at 149 (“Nor can there be 
any doubt that the impact of the governmental defendants’ 
termination of the project was felt primarily by blacks, who 
make up a substantial proportion of those who would be 
eligible to reside there.”) (emphasis added).   
 
 The Township may be correct that a disparate impact 
analysis will often allow plaintiffs to make out a prima facie 
case when a segregated neighborhood is redeveloped in 
circumstances where there is a shortage of alternative 
affordable housing.  But this is a feature of the FHA’s 
programming, not a bug.  The FHA is a broadly remedial 
statute designed to prevent and remedy invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race,  see Havens Realty Corp. 
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982), that facilitates its anti-
discrimination agenda by encouraging a searching inquiry 
into the motives behind a contested policy to ensure that it is 
not improper.  See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 642, 652 (2001) 
(remarking that a “leading gloss” on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
is that “disparate impact functions as a means of smoking out 
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subtle or underlying forms of intentional discrimination on 
the basis of group membership.”).  We need not be concerned 
that this approach is too expansive because the establishment 
of a prima facie case, by itself, is not enough to establish 
liability under the FHA.  It simply results in a more searching 
inquiry into the defendant’s motivations—precisely the sort 
of inquiry required to ensure that the government does not 
deprive people of housing “because of race.” 
 
 Finally, the Township seems to argue that its 
redevelopment plan does not violate Title VIII unless the 
statistics show that it increases segregation in the Township.  
(Twp. Br. at 18.).  Showing that a policy has a segregative 
effect is one way to establish a violation of Title VIII, but it is 
not the only way.  See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937 
(observing that a policy often discriminates in one of two 
ways:  having a disparate impact or perpetuating segregation).  
The Township is free to argue that its plan is less 
discriminatory than all of the available alternatives because it 
does the best job of integrating the neighborhood.  However, 
those arguments are properly considered in the context of the 
last steps of the Title VIII analysis, not as a requirement of 
the prima facie case.  
 
 In reality, the District Court’s decision was based on a 
valid and practical concern, which appears to drive its 
reasoning throughout the opinion.  It feared that finding a 
disparate impact here would render the Township powerless 
to rehabilitate its blighted neighborhoods.  This underlying 
rationale distorts the focus and analysis of disparate impact 
cases under the FHA.  In disparate impact cases, “[e]ffect, not 
motivation, is the touchstone because a thoughtless housing 
practice can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful 
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scheme.”  Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 
(8th Cir. 1977).  Once the Residents established a prima facie 
case of disparate impact, the District Court’s inquiry must 
continue to determine whether a person is being deprived of 
his lawful rights because of his race.  It must ask whether that 
Township’s legitimate objectives could have been achieved in 




Once the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the 
defendants must offer a legitimate reason for their actions.  In 
this case, everyone agrees that alleviating blight is a 
legitimate interest.  The core of the dispute between the 
parties is over the next step of the FHA’s burden-shifting 
analysis:  whether the defendants have shown that there is no 
less discriminatory alternative.  Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149.  Only 
when the defendants make this showing does the burden shift 
back to the plaintiffs—where it ultimately remains—to 
provide evidence of such an alternative.  Id. at 149 n.37.  The 
test for whether there is no alternative is “similar to the test of 
whether the defendant has demonstrated that the requested 
accommodation is ‘unreasonable’ for the purposes of 
rebutting a claim under § 3604(f)(3)(B).”  Lapid-Laurel, 284 
F.3d at 468.  Section 2604(f)(3)(B) of the FHA requires that 
reasonable housing accommodations be made for individuals 
with disabilities.  In other words, the defendant must show 
that the alternatives impose an undue hardship under the 
circumstances of this specific case.  See US Airways v. 
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002) (discussing the term 




 The District Court characterized the Residents’ 
proposed alternative as follows: 
 
[E]ffectively, plaintiffs are seeking to remain 
living in the blighted and unsafe conditions 
until they are awarded money damages for their 
claims and sufficient compensation to secure 
housing in the local housing market. Although 
couched at times like an effort to have the 
development go up around them, like a highway 
built around a protected tree, or to have their 
units rehabilitated, this makes little if no 
practical sense after years of litigation, 
approved redevelopment plans, and the 
expenditure of significant public resources. At 
this late stage, the only real practical remedy is 
for plaintiffs to receive the fair value for their 
home as well as proper and non-discriminatory 
relocation procedures and benefits . . . .  The 
relief they are seeking is inconsistent with 
proving the fourth element of their FHA claim-
namely, that an alternative course of action to 
eminent domain and relocation is viable. 
(JA 17 n.12) (ellipsis in original).   
 
 The Residents’ evidence is susceptible to more 
favorable inferences.  The Residents are not asking for 
permission to continue to live in “blighted and unsafe” 
conditions.  Instead, they argue that there is a feasible plan 
that meets the Township’s goals and entails more substantial 
rehabilitation.  Taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Residents, one could credit the report of the 
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Residents’ planning expert, which stated that the “blighted 
and unsafe” conditions could be remedied in a far less heavy-
handed manner that would not entail the wholesale 
destruction and rebuilding of the neighborhood.  
  
The Residents’ expert pointed out that, although the 
Revised West Rancocas Plan called for development in 
stages, the Township began the development by aggressively 
acquiring houses, which it left vacant and then destroyed.  He 
opined that a more gradual redevelopment plan would have 
allowed existing residents to move elsewhere in the 
neighborhood during one part of the redevelopment, and then 
move back once the redevelopment was completed.  The 
Residents’ expert further noted that the Township had not 
performed a comparative cost analysis showing that total 
demolition, relocation, and new construction was less feasible 
than an alternative focused on rehabilitation.  Indeed, the 
expert went on to propose an alternative redevelopment plan 
that would rely on the targeted acquisition and rehabilitation 
of some of the existing Gardens homes, the combination of 
some houses to make larger homes, an initiative to make the 
houses more attractive through the use of landscaping and 
added amenities such as decks and porches, and selective 
demolition and new construction, including the construction 
of more affordable units.  The Residents’ expert also provided 
examples of previous alternatives—including one developed 
as early as 1989—to show that the complete demolition of the 
neighborhood was not the only possible solution to blight in 
the Gardens.9
                                              
9 The 1989 plan was not provided as the alternative but 
only to show that less discriminatory alternatives had been 
considered in the past and could serve as the basis for an 
  Finally, he provided a non-exhaustive list of 
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state and federal funding programs that would support such a 
redevelopment plan and observed that the Township had 
failed to make an active effort to locate a developer with 
experience in neighborhood rehabilitation.  
 
The Township provided the contrasting statements of 
its Township manager, who argued that a rehabilitation 
program was not economically feasible.  In support, she cited 
the fact that one alternative, the Mt. Holly 2000 program, 
demonstrated that rehabilitation of each unit would be 
extremely costly.  She also challenged the availability of 
sources of funding for a rehabilitation.  Lastly, she 
emphasized the many problems that led the Township to 
declare the Gardens an area in need of redevelopment and 
asserted the belief of the Township Council and its planning 
board that demolition and replacement is the most effective 
and efficient approach to solving the neighborhood’s 
problems. 
 
These contrasting statements, as well as the parties’ 
continued arguments on appeal as to the cost and feasibility 
of an alternative relying on rehabilitation, create genuine 
issues of material fact that require further investigation.  Once 
the record on alternatives has been more fully developed, the 
District Court may entertain renewed motions for summary 
judgment, taking into account the Township’s initial burden 
of showing that there are no less discriminatory alternatives, 
as well as the standard advanced in Lapid-Laurel for 
                                                                                                     
updated approach that would lessen the redevelopment’s 
impact on minority residents of the Township. 
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The Residents are also seeking to recover under the 
theory that the Township intentionally discriminated against 
its minority residents when it adopted the redevelopment 
plan.  The District Court saw no evidence of intentional 
discrimination and granted the Township’s motion for 
summary judgment.  After carefully considering the matter, 
we discern no error in the District Court’s decision and will 




 The Township has broad discretion to implement the 
policies it believes will improve its residents’ quality of life.  
But that discretion is bounded by laws like the FHA and by 
the Constitution, which prevent policies that discriminate on 
the basis of race.  For this reason, “the federal courts must 
                                              
10 Triad asserts that the portion of the District Court’s 
order relating to its involvement should be affirmed because 
the Residents, on appeal, have waived their claims against it.  
We disagree.  In their brief, the Residents argue that the 
redevelopers, which include Triad, provided inadequate 
relocation assistance, allowed residents to be improperly 
pressured to leave, and that the redevelopment plan 
essentially pushes minority residents out of Mount Holly.  For 
all of the reasons stated in this opinion, these are genuine 
issues of material fact that must be resolved through further 
discovery on remand. 
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stand prepared to provide ‘such remedies as are necessary to 
make effective the congressional purpose.’”  Rizzo, 564 F.2d 
at 149 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 
(1964)).  A more developed factual record will assist the 
District Court in crafting appropriate remedies, if necessary.  
For all of the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment is vacated and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings.  
